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ANTI-COMPETITIVE MARKETING PRACTICES
IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY: A PUBLIC POLICY
PERSPECTIVE
Terrence J. Kearney, Chicago State University
Richard Robinson, Marquette Univer.fity

ABSTRACT
Consumers, airlines and the economy as a whole have benefitted from airline deregulation. Government regulation was
rep/aced by competition as the protector ofthe consumers. Airlines continue to pursue marketing strategies which reduce
competition and as act as barriers to new entrants. This paper reviews some of those strategies and suggest actions by
which policy makers might encourage competition.

INTRODUCTION
Since the deregulation of the airline industry, during
the late 1970s, consumers have benefitted from
competition. It has been estimated timL consumers
henefitterl in th~ IlmOllnt of about six billion dollars per
ycar in lower fares. Most of tllls saving has gone to
vacation travelers and to travelers in major markets
(USDOT 1998). Business travelers have benefitted from
increased flight frequencies. As air travel has increased,
airlines have expanded and modernized their fleets.
Operating efficiencies gained in the highly competitive
domestic market have made U.S . carriers nearly
invincible in international markets. (It should be noted
that airline deregulation has also resulted in larger, more
r.rowded aircraft, lower spending on in-flight food and
service and crowded airspace resulting in delays.)
The airline industry is rapidly changing. Most major
U.S. carriers are focusing more on international flights
than ever before (AIllk:rsun 1998a). Recent "open sky"
agreements open new markets to U.S. flag carriers and
allow foreign carriers more access to our international
markets (Gourdin 1998). (Recent declines in the
economies of the Asia rim and of Latin America have
caused some carriers to rethink this move to dependence
on international flights.) The NAFT A agreement has
given Canadian and Mexican carriers increased access to
U.S. markets (Kearney & Robinson 1993).
Airline industry policy makers are faced today with
marketing strategies and public policies which threaten to

reduce the level of competition in the industry. There
needs to be a discussion of what level of competition is
good for consumers, the airline industry and the nation.
There also needs to be a discussion of what public
policies need lu be adopLed Lo reach this level of
competition in a changing world. This papcr will outline
the various threats to competition and list some of the
options policy makers might have available.
The airline industry is important not only as an
industry, in itself, but also as an industry which has a
major effect on suppliers, customers and complementary
industries. Low air fares and frequent service are
prerequisites for much of the tourism and convention
industries. Aircraft makers, food suppliers and travel
agents depend on thc large volume thc industry presently
enjoys. The industry is also important as an example and
testing ground for policies being proposed in other
industries. The international alliances described in this
paper are similar to alliances being proposed or
as
developed
in
such
diverse
industries
telecommunications, banking, insurance and fmancial
services. The success or failure of this industry under
deregulation could effect the deregulation of and the
shape of such industries as local phone service, electricity
and telecommunications.

DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION
Prior to deregulation, airlines were regulated by the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in three major ways;
market entrance, flight frequency and pricing. New
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carriers were basically barred from starting operations.
Existing carriers fmUld it difficult to add new city pairs or
to change their frequency of service in existing markets.
Prices changes had to be approved by the CAB and
applied to all of the carriers in a market. Price discounts
were limited and available only to groups such as
students and military personnel. Airlines tended to
compete on customer service elements, such as meal
service, seat comfort and movies. The government
directly subsidized service to a few small communities
and indirectly subsidized service to many more by
allowing high profit levels in major markets and requiring
each carrier to serve some money losing smaller markets.
Under deregulation, airlines were free to serve what
markets they wanted, with flight frequencies they wanted
and at the price they wanted. Most carriers adopted
similar strategies in response to deregulation. They
reduced or abandoned service to small unprofitable
markets, and increased prices in those small markets they
continued to serve (Kearney 1988). They decreased
prices in major markets and entered new long-haul highdensity markets. Most carriers began offering discounts
subject to complicated restrictions to differentiate
business and non-business travelers. They also changed
the service level they offered the consumer. They
increased the number of seats per aircraft by reducing
space between seats and the size of the seats, increased
the load factor (percentage of available seats filled by
paying customer), and reduced spending on meals and
amenities (Kearney 1988). Most carriers soon started to
build hub and spoke route systems to gain operating
efficiencies and to ensure "on-line -feed" (continuation of
passengers over connecting flight segments) (Meade
1988).
The strategies adopted by the major airlines did not
insure success. While carriers had previously made
money in long-haul high-density markets, high levels of
competition brought price levels in these markets down.
Travelers shopped for price and showed little or no brand
loyalty. Rapid expansion strained airline finances.
Within a few years of being deregulated, most airlines
were losing money (Meade 1988).
During the early days of deregulation, new carriers
entered the market and some carriers which had
previously been air taxi, regional, or charter carriers
expanded their operations to become major airlines.
Some were successful. Some were not. For the first time
since the 1930s, airlines were allowed to survive or fail
on their own. Some of the new carriers went under in a
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matter of months; some old carriers entered bankruptcy.
One problem that new entrants presented is that most
operated at lower cost than their older, larger
competitors, making price competition a threat to major
carriers (Kearney 1988).
By the mid 1980s, most carriers were adopting
strategies which were designed to reduce the need to
compete on price. Frequent flyer programs were
introduced that tended to tie the most valuable customers
to one carrier, creating artificial brand loyalty. A series of
mergers created regionally dominant carriers and
eliminated regional competitors (NorthwestJRepublic,
TWAJOzark, USAirlPiedmont) (Kearney 1988). Other
mergers were attempts to feed passengers into larger
route systems (panAmlNational, DeitalWestern).
Reservation systems were employed to give host carriers
an advantage (Meade 1988). New carriers were denied
access to airports under leasing arrangements between
the airlines and the airport operators (Kearney 1988).
CONTESTABILITY

When airlines were deregulated, there was an
expectation that competition would take the place of
regulation in providing cheap, high quality service to
airline passengers. The mobile nature of air transport
suggested that no carrier would be able to dominate a
market and reap monopoly profits. If prices were high in
a market, other airlines would enter and compete excess
profits away. Since it was assumed that airlines would
have comparable costs of production, competition would
provide reasonable, but not exorbitant profit levels
(Bailey 1981).
The mobility of capital investment was also assumed
to provide "contestability," that is, the threat of entry
would keep prices down in markets which were being
served by one or few carriers (Baumol 1982). This is
important in public policy analysis because policy makers
are shifting away from looking at the number of
competitors in a market, to examining the ease in which
new competitors can enter the market. Carriers would be
able to charge more, but not substantially more, in less
dense markets which their competitors choose not to
serve.
These assumptions have been found to be, at least
partially, wrong. Operating costs vary dramatically from
airline to airline. New entrant carriers and those which
have been through bankruptcy tend to have much lower
operating costs than the older major carriers. This has
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allowed some carriers to dominate individual markets.
While these lower cost carriers have used price to gain
control of these markets, there is little market threat to
their ability to raise prices after gaining control because
higher cost carriers know that they can't hope for a win
or even a tie in a price war. Major carriers have resorted
to buying or forming alliances with lower cost carriers to
allow the major carriers to compete in lower density
markets. These carriers often use code sharing (giving the
smaller carriers flights flight numbers of the larger
carner) and even name changes (American Eagle, United
Exprcss) that disguise their status as entities scparatc
from the parent company.
The issue of contestability is a more controversial
topic. Consensus among economists and policy makers is
that airline markets are partially contestable; that is,
carriers can enter new markets, but not with perfect
freedom and often at a disadvantage to incumbent
carriers. This allows higher than expected yields and load
factors in many markets. The question for policy makers
is what are the barriers to contestability (entry) and what
can be dom: Lo remove or mitigate the effect of these
barriers.

most flights. The carrier which offers the most flights is
most likely to offer a flight at or near the time of day any
individual passenger wishes to fly (Keamey 1988). If
consumers or travel agents are able to make convenient
reservations with the first airline they investigate, they are
unlikely to continue their search. Business travellers are
likely to pay more for a more convenient time and are not
likely to shop for cheaper fares at less convenient times.
> Tht: mit: of inLt:rnaLional gaLeway flights and
regional feeder flights in establishing airport and city pair
dominance. Most airlines are still rt:gional. Tht:y Lt:nu Lo
have their smaller markets concentrated in some parts of
the country, even if they serve long haul markets to other
parts of the country. Passengers prefer single airline
service even if they have to change planes on a trip. The
same is true of international passengers. They may have
to change airplanes, but most prefer to keep the same
airline through the trip. The feed of passengers from
international and short haul flights give some airlines an
advantage of a base level of business before they have to
compete with other carriers in a market. This occurs at a
natural level. It will be discussed below that some
carriers have also tried to stimulate artificial levels of online-feed through marketing strategies.

BARRIERS TO CONTESTABILITYIENTRY
Some entry barriers can be seen as natural. That is,
that these barriers exist as part of the nature of the
industry and there is little policy makers can, or should,
do about these. Some of these natural barriers are:
> The long tenn effects of advertising and marketing
as an investment in name recognition and airline image.
The cumulative effect of decades of advertising is a major
advantage for incumbent carriers. Casual consumers
know a few major airlines. While travel agents and
frequent flyers might bc aware of new entrants and price
or service advantages they might bring, less informed
passengers are more likely to think of airlines they have
known for years (Kearney 1988).
> The advantage to being the largest carrier at an
airport or in a city pair market. There is a relationship
which has been documented for years between the largest
carrier in a market and the load factor of that carrier. That
is, the carrier offering the most seats in a market will
receive a more than proportional number of paying
passengers, all other things being equal. This is related to
the factor described above, larger carriers are often
carriers which have advertised in the market for years,
but it also a function of flight frequency. The carrier
which offers the most seats in a market usually offers the
Marketing Management Association 1999 Proceedings

Whilc thC barricrs listcd abovc arc naturally
occurring, other barriers are the result of conscious
planning. These attempts to create artificial barriers to
competition have been implemented, in some cases, in
spite of government concems. In other cases, these
programs have been implemented with the active
participation of government agencies. While there is little
that can reasonably be done about the natural barriers to
competition, discussed above, the artificial barriers are
subject to regulation. These artificial barriers include:
:> Fn:qut!Il.Lllyer programs. FrequenL flyer programs
create artificial brand loyalty, especially among business
travelers. The cumulative nature of the rewards (the
more miles you have, the much more they arc worth) lead
passengers to choose the airline with which they have
mileage accounts, not the one offering the best deal. In
the case of business passengers, when someone else is
paying for the flight, there is a strong incentive to choose
flights to maximize frequent flyer mileage credits. This
moves the major carriers, especially the carrier with the
largest presence in a given city, away from price
competition and insulates them, somewhat, from lower
cost carriers.

> Travel agent commISSIOn overrides. It IS the
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practice of airlines to pay a higher level of commission to
travel agents who do more than a specified percentage of
their business with that airline. Since most travel agencies
are local, these overrides can create an advantage in city
and city-pair markets for larger carriers. The travel agent
is given an incentive to put passengers on the preferred
airline, whether or not that airline offers the best price or
service for the passenger. With the complicated nature of
airline reservation programs, most passengers will never
realize that they were misled by the travel agent.
> Airport capacity restrictions. Some of the busiest
airports (The airports that airlines most want to serve.) in
the country are under restriction by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) as to how many flights an hour
may land and take-off. With the increase in inter-national
and freight traffic at these airports in recent years, the
number of slots available to domestic, especially shorthaul carriers, is becoming even more limited. Since most
of these slots are controlled by large carriers, it is difficult
for other carriers to enter the market (Anderson 1998b).
The government (FAA & DOT) has the power to
reallocate these spots, but chooses not to do so; even
allowing airlines to buy and sell slots as if they were
private property. Even in cities with second airports
(New York, Chicago, Washington), control of gates at
the main airport is a major advantage. Improvements in
air traffic control and movement of military, general and
corporate aviation to secondary airports has offered a few
more slots to airlines. Political pressure from various
interest groups has slowed the awarding of new slots. In
October of 1998, for example, Congressman Henry Hyde
(R. n.) blocked the addition of between 20 and 100 slots
a day being added at 0 'Hare in response to concerns of
ills constituents concerning noise at the airport.
>Airport gate leasing restrictions. Most U.S. airports
have been built by local government bodies. These
agencies often lack the capital to construct such large
installations. The practice has been to have the airlines
help finance these projects in return for control of a
block of gates, or even a terminal. These lease
agreements often extend for decades. The existence of
these leases can keep new entrants out of airports, or in
some cases, consign these smaller carriers to less
desirable locations in the terminal (Kearney 1988).
Airlines willch cannot get a reasonably convenient gate at
an airport, operate at a competitive disadvantage.
>Airline alliances & Joint marketing agreements: In
recent years, airlines have begun to form alliances. The
first of these were the local service carriers which became
extensions of the larger carriers (United Express,
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American Eagle). Tills was followed by international
alliances between major carriers and major foreign
carriers. The third form of alliances was domestic, in
which major carriers allied with other (usually weaker)
major carriers (Anderson 1998c, Gourdin 1998). The
nature of the barriers presented by domestic and
international alliances are described below.
>Domestic alliances. The older of the two forms of
domestic alliances, that between major carriers and local
service carriers, has been around long enough to judge
the results. These alliances started as a means of offering
low cost service in small markets in order to compete
with the low cost start-up carriers. The local service
carrier would get the advantage of the name recognition,
reputation and reservation support services of the larger
carrier. The larger carrier would get some revenue from
these markets, but, more important, would get the online-feed from the smaller carrier. Tills was important in
building strong dominant hubs. The through traffic could
be kept on the parent airline through the use of code
sharing. By extending frequent flyer mileage to
passengers on the smaller carrier, more brand loyalty was
built. The dominance that these arrangements helped
build reached beyond the hubs to entire regions of the
country. Barriers were created against competition in
both the long-haul and short-haul markets affected by the
arrangements (Anderson 1998b).
> International alliances.
The international
alliances take the form of code sharing, frequent flyer
program merger, schedule coordination and ground
service. The purpose of these agreements is not only to
reduce competition in international markets (though by
the nature of international air commerce agreements,
there are usually only two carriers in the international
markets), but also to reduce competition in domestic
markets (Anderson 1998A). In the agreement between
UAL and Lufthansa, a passenger can make a reservation
on a flight with a U AL flight number and fly from Des
Moines to O'Hare on a United Express flight operated by
a small, low-cost airline; transfer at 0 'Hare to a
Lufthansa aircraft; cross the Atlantic and board a
Lufthansa short haul flight from Frankfort to Hamburg.
The passenger receives UAL Mileage Plus mileage for all
three legs, has a single UAL flight number from Des
Moines to Hamburg and may never set foot on a U AL
aircraft. Lufthansa gets a passenger across the Atlantic
and for the short haul in Germany, U AL might get the
passenger on the return trip, but gets some revenue from
the short haul trips to and from Des Moines. UAL
strengthens its hold on O 'Hare for Domestic and
International traffic.
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>Cabotage restrictions. Across the world, with very
few exceptions, nations restrict domestic air service to
their own airlines. United or American can't cany
passengers between Paris and Nice or between Hamburg
and Frankfort. In most countries this is not a major issue,
in that they have negligible amounts of domestic air
travel. The u.s. domestic airline market represents over
half the domestic air travel in the world. Foreign carriers
have wauteu tu gain the right to continuation traffic on
flights originating outside of the U. S. but serving more
than one point in the country. For example, on a flight
from Singapore to San Francisco to Chicago, the leg from
San Francisco to Chicago would be a domestic leg.
United (VAL) or Northwest (NWA) can pick up
passengers in San Francisco bound for Chicago. Air
Singapore cannot. An Air Singapore flight must travel
half empty on the last leg. The U.S. based carrier has an
advantage in both the International Market over Air
Singapore and in the domestic market over domestic
competitors. In addition a landing slot is being used in
San Francisco and in Chicago, but no competitive
pressure is being put on UAL or NW A.

operations that would reduce competition. Any merger
that would give the new carrier a dominant position at
any major airport, or in major city pairs should be
opposed, unless gates, slots, and flight frequencies would
be given up to other carriers. Mergers such as TWAOzark or Northwest -Republic have been allowed in the
past ill SVite uf majur n:uuctions in competition and
contestability.
>Subject alliances and joint marketing agreements to
the same scrutiny to which proposed mergers would be
subjected. This should bc thc case both for domestic and
international alliances. Since they behave much like
merged carriers, they should be treated like merged
carners.
>Allow continuation cabotage for foreign carriers in
markets that are deemed to be uncompetitive. When
domestic carriers are not able or willing to challenge
dominant carriers in domestic markets, foreign carriers
serving one or both of the cities in the city pair should be
offered the opportunity. The presence of, or threat of
entry of an extra carrier coulu act tu restrain the dominant
carrier.

POLICY RESPONSES TO ANTI-

COMPETITIVE BEHAVIORS

>Rcstrict the use of commission ovelTides for travel
or at least n~qllire travel agents to infonn
consumers of any override programs in which they
participate. Full disclosure would remove some of the
moral hazard faced by travel agents to give customers
less than the best deal. Smaller carriers would be able to
compete on an even basis.
ugeIlL~,

The anti-competitive strategies and constructs
described above combine to result in an airline market
that is not fully contestable. Airline passengers face high
prices in some markets due to lack of competition. Entire
regions of the country are dependent on individual
carriers for service (as can be seen in the recent strike
against Northwest Airlines). Policy makers have acted in
the past to end, or reduce, ablJses of the airline
reservation systems. They can act again to secure the
advantage~ of competition for the flying pUblic. Wltile
policy makers cannot do much about naturally occurring
barriers, and cannot expect to wipe out all other anticompetitive behaviors, there are some things that can
increase, or at least reduce the decreasing of, competition.
Among those actions are:
>Increase the number of slots available at the busy
airports, and allocate them with the intent of increasing
competition. This could be done by simply refusing to
award new slots to dominant carriers, or by requiring that
airlines applying for new slots detail how those slots
would be used to increase competition.
>Subject airline mergers to strict scrutiny when
those mergers would result in a significant reduction in
competition, or require the merging carriers to divest
Marketing Management Association 1999 Proceedings

>Increase the number of gates available to smaller
carriers at un-competitive airports. It will be difficult to
change existing leases, but policy makers can restrict
dominant carriers from acquiring new leases when other
carriers leave and can pay attcntion to the interests of
non-dominant carriers when planning expansions and
renovations to airports.
>Tax that portion of frequent 11yer awards stemming
from business travel, paid for by the business. Ifbusiness
travelers receive benefits from travel for which their
employers have paid they should be taxed on those
benefits as regular income. If business travelers had to
pay income tax on their personal use of mileage awards,
these awards would be less valuable.
>Require airlines to disclose to whomever pays for
a ticket, how many frequent flyer miles a passenger
received using the ticket. Airlines have resisted
disclosure, citing privacy concerns. In reality they are
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concerned about theses programs becoming less powerful
tools. If employers knew how many miles employees
accumulated through business travel, they could require
the employee to use the benefits for business travel. This
would remove the incentive for the employee to make
travel decisions on the basis of mileage, and remove the
ability of these programs to shield the airline from
competition.

Policy makers should make the increase of
competition a priority in the airline industry. There are
affirmative policies, well short of a return to onerous
regulation, that can make the industry more competitive.
Some of them have been outlined here, but there are other
actions that can be taken. Deregulation has benefited the
consumer, the airlines and the complementary industries.
The benefits of deregulation should not be lost to anticompetitive marketing strategies. Policy makers have a
duty to act.
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